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Abstract: For many analysts, the Chinese economy is spurred by a bubble in the hous-
ing market, probably driven by the fiscal stimulus package and massive credit expan-
sion, with possible adverse effects to the real economy. To get insights into the size of 
the bubble, the house price evolution is investigated by panel cointegration techniques. 
Evidence is based on a dataset for 35 major cities. Cointegration is detected between 
real house prices and a set of macroeconomic determinants, implying that a bubble ex-
hibits mean-reverting behaviour. The results indicate that the bubble is about 25 percent 
of the equilibrium value implied by the fundamentals at the end of 2009. The bubble is 
particularly huge in the cities in the southeast coastal areas and special economic zones. 
While the impact of real house prices on CPI inflation appears to be rather strong, GDP 
growth may not be heavily affected. Thus, a decline of the bubble will likely have only 
modest effects on the real economy. 
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1  Introduction 
For many observers, the Chinese economy is spurred by a bubble in the real estate mar-
ket, probably driven by the fiscal stimulus package and massive credit expansion. For 
example, the stock of loans increased by more than 50 percent since the end of 2008. 
The government urged banks to increase lending to mitigate the economic slowdown 
(Nicolas, 2009). Home mortgage loans have played a significant role in the develop-
ment, as they account for one third of the total lending activities. Currently, house prices 
are at all time highs, and have been increasing at high rates especially over recent years 
(Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2010). Banks have provided easy credit for housing develop-
ment, probably without sufficient evaluation of risks. State-owned enterprises may have 
stimulated the development, as they have access to low cost capital and may believe 
they are too big to fail. 
To slowdown the development, the People’s Bank of China has increased its nominal 
interest rate. The Chinese government has introduced measures to combat record prices, 
including higher mortgage rates.  Down-payment requirements for second homes have 
been raised extensively. In some high housing price cities, house owners are restricted 
in further house purchases. Many state run mortgage lenders have started to cut mort-
gage discounts. Additional measures are in the pipeline, for example higher taxes on 
property. As a result, housing prices in the first-tier cities stopped rising further, but are 
still at record levels. 
The housing issue is not only a problem from an economic perspective, but also an issue 
of the people’s livelihood that can affect social stability. Households with average in-
come feel that they cannot afford buying a house. Ratios of house prices to average an-3 
 
nual income exceed 18 in Beijing (Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2010).  The government’s 
challenge is to scrap out speculative inflows, whilst not killing a major growth engine. 
However, while accelerating house prices may indicate the presence of a bubble, its 
existence is controversial. In fact, urbanization trends, rising incomes and low interest 
rates can have triggered the evolution. Higher house prices may be still broadly in line 
with the fundamental factors, and could be still supported by solid demand for residen-
tial housing (World Bank, 2010). 
A burst of a house price bubble can endanger the stability of the real economy. For ex-
ample, Helbling and Terrones (2003) have pointed out that house price busts are asso-
ciated with output losses twice as large as equity bubbles. See also Goodhart and Hof-
mann (2008). In general, a slump in real estate prices might be more harmful than a 
stock market crash because real estate is the more important collateral underlying bank 
loans and house ownership is more widespread across the population. Shocks might 
transmit through a number of channels, including credit crunches and lower construc-
tion activities. 
Because of a low leverage, the risk with respect to people not being able to fund their 
mortgage commitment might not be very high. However, housing investment is an im-
portant pillar for economic growth, even in the long run (Liu, Park and Zheng, 2002). 
Its share in GDP is 10 percent, much more than in the industrialized economies. Chen 
and Zhu (2008) have concluded from their analysis that an increase in housing invest-
ment of 1 percent will cause a rise in GDP of 0.2 percent. Due to the ongoing integra-
tion of China into the world markets, a bubble might also have an international dimen-
sion. If a decline house prices contributes to lower output growth, negative spillovers to 
other countries could occur. According to many analysts, the apparent house price bub-4 
 
ble is one of the major risks for a sound recovery of the global economy after the finan-
cial crisis. 
In this paper, the house price development is investigated both at the national and re-
gional level. The contribution is twofold. First, it is investigated whether a bubble ex-
ists. The point of departure is a long run equilibrium between real house prices and de-
mographic and macroeconomic conditions. Using a regional dataset for 35 major cities, 
the size of the bubble is estimated relative to the fundamental level implied by the panel 
cointegrating relationship. Second, the impact of real house prices on CPI inflation and 
GDP growth is investigated at the national level using an in sample and out of sample 
framework. 
The results indicate the presence of a house price bubble. At the end of 2009, real house 
prices are 25 percent above their equilibrium value. However, heterogeneities are strik-
ing across the country. The bubble is especially pronounced in the cities of the southeast 
coastal areas and the special economic zones. While the impact of real house prices on 
CPI inflation seems to be rather strong, GDP growth may not be heavily affected. Real 
house prices do not cause GDP growth, and point forecasts of GDP growth are not sub-
stantially improved if the house price evolution is taken into account. These findings 
might reflect a limited exposure of private households’ expenditures to housing wealth. 
The household saving rate is rather high and the down payment requirement is quite 
stringent.  Therefore, a decline  of the bubble could  have  only  modest effects on the 
course of the real economy. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section (section 2) reviews major changes 
in the Chinese housing and land market. Methods to detect bubbles and econometric 5 
 
issues are discussed in section 3. Data and empirical results are presented in section 4. 
Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2  The Chinese housing and land market 
Prior to China’s housing reform, virtually no private housing existed in the urban area. 
All housing properties have been owned by the state and allocated to urban dwellers by 
the government or state-controlled work units at very low rent. Due to lack of invest-
ment in residential property, housing conditions in the cities remained very poor. For 
example, the living space of urban dwellers was about 4 square meters per capita in the 
late 1970s.  
Since the early1990s, housing policies switched from the state allocation system to a 
market-oriented one. A series of reforms have been implemented, which have signifi-
cantly reduced the role of the state as provider of housing and allowed for the emer-
gence of a private housing sector. As a first measure, state controlled apartments have 
been sold to the tenants at a lower-than-market price. Since then, the government has 
consistently promoted investment and purchases in the real estate market. Over the last 
decade, housing investment has grown at annual rates of 20 percent. Housing has be-
come the most important private property for urban Chinese (Wang, 2003). Living con-
ditions improved steadily. For example, the urban housing space per capita increased to 
24 square meters. In 2009, investment in the real state sector accounted for 16 percent 
of China’s total investment. The housing industry has become a main engine of China’s 
economic growth. 6 
 
The state has still the ultimate ownership of urban lands. Local governments, as the rep-
resentative of the central government, are empowered to allocate lands to different us-
ers. By controlling both land supply and the overall planning of land development for 
the city, local governments can decide what can be built in their jurisdictions, subject to 
state regulation (Cai and Zhang, 2009). Initially, land transactions have been conducted 
with the price being either negotiated between the buyer and seller, or set by the local 
governmental. The land transaction price has been often lower than the market one, 
creating rent for corruption. Since 2004, all transactions in urban lands must be carried 
out through public auction or bidding to prevent rent seeking behaviour. The successful 
bidder would obtain a long-term leasing contract for specified use. 
Individuals are permitted to purchase urban land-use rights for up to 70 years for resi-
dential, 50 years for industrial and 40 years  for commercial use (Wu, Gyourko and 
Deng, 2010). Under this long term contract, the land price is believed to reflect devel-
opments in the housing sector with some delay. For example, Du, Ma and An (2010) 
have reported Granger causality running from land to house prices, but not vice versa. 
According to Peng and Thibodeau (2009), residential property prices do not have an 
impact on land prices after 2004. See also Zheng and Kahn (2008). In recent years how-
ever, with soaring land prices and rapid commercialization of the housing market, land 
auctions have become a major source of revenues for local governments. In Beijing, the 
land auction revenue currently accounts for 46 percent total revenue of the municipal 
government. 
The rapid urbanization and the ongoing trend for smaller families have created strong 
housing demand. Since 1990, the number of city dwellers in Beijing has increased from 
10.8 to 17.6 billion, while the household size decreased from 3.2 to 1.7. The newly reg-7 
 
istered marriage raised by 54 percent since 2007 (Beijing Statistical Yearbook). For 
many Chinese, especially for young couples, renting an apartment is not very popular. 
The regulation system does not give tenants much protection. For example, renters will 
lose their apartments if the home owner decides of a different use. The preference to 
own a house has considerably driven up the demand in the housing market. Due to high 
economic growth, millions of Chinese join the middle class each year, thereby contri-
buting to high housing demand. Because of high saving rates, many households are able 
to buy a house with cash and are rather independent on mortgage loans. In addition, the 
uneven regional development has enhanced the housing demand in the first-tier cities, 
as there are better living conditions, more job opportunities, and better social and public 
resources. 
As a social housing provision system for low income families has not been fully estab-
lished yet, housing affordability therefore becomes not only an economic issue, but also 
an issue of social stability (Deng, Shen and Wang, 2009, Zenou, 2010). One require-
ment for having access to the social housing is that at least one member of the house-
hold must have a local permanent non-agricultural hukou registration for more than five 
years. This regulation is intended to control migration from the rural areas. By allowing 
for a large amount of temporary migration, hukou has contributed to the creation of a 
group of urban residents with restricted rights. Excluded from the urban housing sys-
tem, many of the rural migrants reside in the urban villages that are not integrated in the 
city administration. 
 
3  Bubbles in housing markets 8 
 
An asset price bubble is a price acceleration that cannot be explained in terms of the 
underlying fundamental economic variables (Flood and Hodrick, 1990, Case and Shil-
ler, 2003). The most important nonfundamental element driving price increases is the 
belief that prices will continue to rise in the future (Shiller, 2005). Therefore, prices are 
high just because the participants expect that they can sell the asset at a higher price in 
the future, i.e., the price evolution is affected by psychological components. The bubble 
might show a high degree of persistence, as the agents will not change their expecta-
tions frequently. In particular, they are uncertain with respect to the time when the mar-
ket changes its perception. 
Between 2001 to 2004, house prices increased by 25 percent or more in almost every 
major city in China (Deng, Shen and Wang, 2009). Prices continued to rise rapidly from 
2004 to 2007 (Ye and Wu, 2008). The most recent development has been triggered by 
the fiscal stimulus program launched at the end of 2008 in response to the financial cri-
sis (Cova, Pisani and Rebucci, 2010).  
There are some indications that the market might have overheated in 2008/09. In some 
cities, house buyers are picked up by the seller through lottery. The rapid rise nourishes 
exuberant expectations and speculation. Some real estate developers have started hoard-
ing of houses by delaying their sales hoping for bigger profits when prices rises further. 
Due to higher price expectations, families are stretching to pay prices at the edge of 
their means or beyond. The speculation in the housing market might have further stimu-
lated an already existing housing boom. 
Fundamental factors can be either derived from a present value or structural models. In 
any case, a cointegrating relationship between real house prices and the fundamental 
variables is implied. Deviations from the equilibrium might be interpreted as an indica-9 
 
tion of a house price bubble. The present value model ties house prices to a stream of 
earnings associated with the housing property. In a frictionless market, the value of a 
house should be equal to the present value of future housing service flows that are pro-
vided to the marginal buyer (Campbell and Shiller, 1987). The latter can be approx-
imated by the rental value of the house. If the user costs of housing exceed the market 
rent, for example, it would be less expensive to rent than to buy, and demand to buy 
should fall, thereby reducing house prices. Hence, rents are a fundamental determinant 
of the value of housing and should not move too far away from prices, i.e. the price rent 
ratio should exhibit  mean reverting behaviour. This condition is rejected in Chinese 
cities, see Figure 1. The evidence can indicate the presence of a bubble in house prices, 
but might be also explained in terms of the social and institutional environment, since 
renting is not very popular in China. Thus, the steep increase in the price rent ratio 
might not necessarily reflect speculative elements. 
 
-Figure 1 about here- 
 
Structural models are based on the demand and supply side of the housing market. For 
example, Capozza, Hendershott, Mack and Mayer (2002) and Gallin (2006) have advo-
cated models to derive the stationarity of the price income ratio. This measure has in-
creased steadily, especially in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen and Hangzhou (Wu, Gyour-
ko and Deng, 2010). It should be noted, however, that a nonstationary behaviour of the 
indicator does not inevitably imply the presence of a bubble. The structural parameters 
will generally depend on the elasticities governing housing demand and supply. It is 10 
 
also assumed that income is the only nonstationary driver of house prices. As relevant 
demographic and macroeconomic deteminants such as population, land prices and real 
interest rates might  be  integrated  as well, the  analysis  should  be extended by these 
measures. 
Panel cointegration techniques are used to test for a long run relationship between real 
house prices and a set of fundamental factors. The panel includes information for 35 
major Chinese cities over 1998-2009 period. Because of the short time span, residual 
based cointegration tests are preferred, with real house prices as the left hand side vari-
able. On this route, however, two major problems need to be addressed. First, the tests 
often have low power because of an invalid common factor restriction, see Kremers, 
Ericcsson and Dolado (1992). In particular, the long run parameters of the level vari-
ables should be equal to the short run parameters of the differenced variables. To solve 
this problem, Westerlund (2007) has proposed four panel cointegration tests for the null 
of no cointegration that do not impose the common factor restriction. They are based on 
the residuals obtained from individual error correction models. Thus, the short run dy-
namics and deterministic components can differ over the cross section. The two panel 
statistics investigate the alternative that the panel is cointegrated as a whole, while the 
two group mean statistics check the alternative that cointegration holds at least for one 
cross section unit. All tests are one sided, i.e. large negative values imply that the null 
hypothesis should be rejected. 
Second, the panel cointegration tests often rely on the assumption of independent panel 
members. In the presence of cross section dependencies, large size distortions can occur 
(Banerjee, Marcellino and Osbat, 2004). The statistics fail to achieve the normal distri-
bution under the null. In order to circumvent size distortions the critical values are con-11 
 
structed using bootstrap methods, see Chang (2004) and Westerlund (2007) for the de-
tails. 
Note that the panel cointegration tests do not uncover the long run parameters. In the 
application presented below, the cointegration vector is assumed to be identical for all 
cities, as fundamental economic principles are involved. In fact, there is only little theo-
retical rationale for a wide dispersion of the cointegration parameters as the panel mem-
bers are quite homogeneous. Therefore, after testing for cointegration, the pooled mean 
group estimator suggested by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) is applied to reveal the 
common cointegration vector. It restricts the long run coefficients to be identical across 
the panel members, but allows short run coefficients and error variances to vary across 
cities. 
In principle, deviations from the equilibrium might indicate the presence of speculative 
elements in the house price evolution. However, many analysts have argued that a bub-
ble has emerged only in recent years, probably spurred by the fiscal stimulus package 
(Wu, Gyourko and Deng, 2010). Therefore, the evidence can be misleading if the coin-
tegration relation is considered over the whole period. In fact, the cointegration parame-
ters are estimated in a way to capture even the house prices at the end of the sample. As 
a consequence, the size of a bubble will likely be biased downwards. Thus, the long run 
is estimated only up to some point in time. Then, the house price evolution is predicted 
over the rest of the sample, assuming perfect foresight with respect to the fundamentals. 
This leads to an estimate of the fundamental development of house prices, and the size 
of the bubble can be addressed. 
The short run implications of a house price bubble for GDP growth and CPI inflation 
are investigated at the national scale. The evidence is based on different methods to ex-12 
 
tract robust conclusions. In sample results are provided by a Granger causality analysis. 
This is extended by an out of sample exercise, where the information content of real 
house prices is explored. 
 
4  Data and empirical results 
To explore the existence of a bubble in the housing market, the evidence is built on pan-
el data for 35 major cities in China. Annual data are available for the 1998-2009 period. 
Besides the panel data, quarterly series are available at the national level. The national 
data are used to examine the short run consequences of a bubble decline. The relatively 
short time span arises from the fact that there was no real private market neither in land 
nor housing units in China until the late 1990s. Therefore, it is only possible to compare 
current conditions with little more than a decade of data. In fact, the data used in this 
study are all from a boom period. Due to the lack of sufficient data, demographic va-
riables they are not included. Shifts in these conditions might be only moderate in a 
very short time span. Thus, the bulk of the indicators may be captured by the city fixed 
effects. On the other hand, if the indicators have changed over the estimation period, the 
evolution might be erroneously interpreted as a bubble. In that case, the size of a poten-
tial bubble is likely lower. For example, the secular trend towards smaller families leads 
to additional housing demand, i.e. the role of spectulative factors in the price develop-
ment would decrease.  
Information on house prices, land prices, interest rates, GDP, population and the CPI 
(1998=100) are taken from the China Statistical Yearbook. Nominal figures are deflated 
by the CPI to obtain variables in real terms. Income per capita is the ratio between GDP 13 
 
and population, and the real interest rate is the difference between the nominal interest 
rate and CPI inflation for the period ahead. Potential determinants of real house prices 
(hp) may include real land prices (lp), real per capita income (y), population (pop), and 
the real interest rate (r). Despite the real interest rates, all variables are measured in their 
logs. 
To investigate the cointegration properties, the panel and group mean statistics sug-
gested by Westerlund (2007) are employed. Parameters such as the number of lags and 
leads in the individual error correction models are determined by the Schwarz informa-
tion criterion. As the cross sections are not independent, critical values are obtained by 
bootstrap methods, see Persyn and Westerlund (2008). The evidence for certain subsets 
of variables is reported in Table 1. 
 
-Table 1 about here- 
 
The empirical support for a cointegrating relationship between real house prices, real 
per capita income and real interest rates is rather weak, as the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration can be rejected only at the 0.1 level. However, the result is not robust, as it 
is only confirmed by two out of four tests. While this finding might reflect a low power 
problem due to the short time series dimension, the evidence can be improved, if real 
land prices are added to the analysis. In the extended model, most tests indicate the 
presence of a long run equilibrium, even at the 0.05 level. In contrast, the inclusion of 
population distorts the cointegration property. This could be due to the fact that the va-
riable is an imprecise proxy of the sociodemographic trends that determine housing de-14 
 
mand, as the presumably relevant factors such as the reduction of the family size are not 
included. According to this evidence, the further analysis is based on a model compris-
ing real house prices, real per capita income, real land prices and the real interest rate. 
The cointegrating vector is exhibited in Table 2. 
The equilibrium relationship is quite sensible, as the long run parameters are correctly 
signed. While real income per capita and real land prices have a positive effect on real 
house prices, the real interest rate is expected to exert a negative impact. In addition, the 
cointegrating vector seems to be relatively stable over time. Nonetheless, there is some 
tendency of variation in the income and land price elasticities. While income becomes 
more important rises, if data of the more recent years are included, the land price elas-
ticity shows a mild decline. 
 
-Table 2 about here- 
 
The existence of a long run equilibrium between real house prices and their fundamen-
tals implies that a house price bubble, if there is any, is not persistent. Instead, there is 
mean reverting behaviour if deviations from the cointegrating relationship occur. The 
bubble can be inferred from the cointegrating residual. However, this can underestimate 
the true size of the bubble, as the cointegrating parameters reflect the house price devel-
opment until the end of the sample. Since the bubble is a phenomenon of the recent 
years, the parameter regime for the 1998-2007 period is used to predict the fundamental 
development in 2008/09. In this exercise, the actual values of the right hand side va-
riables are included. As an exception, real land prices are fixed to the 2007 levels. Oth-15 
 
erwise, a potential land price bubble could eventually blur a bubble in the housing mar-
ket. 
 
-Figure 2 about here- 
 
The size of the house price bubble is displayed in Figure 2. It can be seen that increas-
ing imbalances have emerged over the past two years. For example, real house prices in 
Shanghai have been 28 percent above the long run equilibrium in 2008, and 35 percent 
in 2009. While the evidence is similar for Beijing, the increase is more spectacular in 
Shenzhen. Compared to the cointegrating relationship, real house prices are overvalued 
by 66 percent in 2009, after 23 percent in 2008. In general, the bubble is more pro-
nounced in the special economic zones and the southeastern coastal regions. Overall, the 
size of the bubble is 20 percent in 2008 and 25 percent in 2009, regardless of whether 
GDP or population weights are applied. 
 
-Tables 3 and 4 about here- 
 
According to the mean reverting behaviour, a decline of the bubble should be expected 
over the period to come. The expected effects of this development on real GDP growth 
and CPI inflation can be investigated at the national level. First, Granger causality tests 
are applied (Table 3). While the null hypothesis that real house prices do not cause GDP 
growth cannot be rejected at conventional levels, it is soundly rejected in case of CPI 16 
 
inflation.  According to this evidence, house prices cause inflation, but probably  not 
GDP growth. 
A similar result can be obtained in an out-of sample exercise. Here, it is examined 
whether the inclusion of real house prices is able to improve the forecasts of year-on-
year CPI inflation and GDP growth, compared to an autoregressive benchmark. The 
forecasts are obtained in a recursive manner. The first estimation subsample is 1998Q1-
2005Q4 and the forecast subsample is 2006Q4-2009Q4. After producing the point fore-
cast for 2006Q4, the estimation period is extended by one quarter (1998Q1-2006Q1) 
and the forecast for 2007Q1 is made. Hence, 13 annual forecasts are derived. The fore-
cast accuracy is evaluated by the root mean square forecast error, expressed relative to 
the benchmark model. For robustness, the relative mean absolute forecast error is also 
reported, see Table 4. It can be seen that the forecast errors of the benchmark are quite 
large, implying that an autoregressive model is not well suited for the Chinese economy. 
The root mean square forecast error exceeds the mean absolute error because of outliers. 
While the forecast accuracy can be increased in case of the CPI inflation, there is only a 
small change in the performance for GDP growth. Overall, these findings suggest that a 
decline of the house price bubble could reduce inflation, without exerting huge negative 
effects on GDP growth. 
 
5  Conclusions  
For many analysts, the Chinese economy is spurred by a bubble in the housing market, 
probably driven by the fiscal stimulus package and massive credit expansion, with poss-
ible adverse effects to the real economy. To get insights into the size of the bubble, the 17 
 
house price evolution is investigated by panel cointegration techniques. Evidence is 
based on a dataset for 35 major cities. Cointegration is detected between real house 
prices and a set of macroeconomic determinants, implying that a bubble exhibits mean-
reverting behaviour. The results indicate that the bubble is about 25 percent of the equi-
librium value implied by the fundamentals at the end of 2009. The bubble is particularly 
huge in the cities in the southeast coastal areas and special economic zones. While the 
impact of real house prices on CPI inflation appears to be rather strong, GDP growth 
may not be heavily affected. Thus, a decline of the bubble will likely have only modest 
effects on the real economy. 18 
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Table 1: Panel cointegration tests 
  Gτ  Gα  Pτ  Pα 
































Note: Data for 35 Chinese cities, sample period 1998-2009. Real house prices (hp), real per capita income 
(y), population (pop), real land prices (lp), real interest rate (r). Real house prices on the left hand side. 
Panel cointegration tests according to Westerlund (2007). Entries denote test statistics, p-values in paran-




Table 2: Estimation of the cointegrating vector 
  1998-2007  1998-2008  1998-2009 


















R2  0.804  0.816  0.830 
Note: Data for 35 Chinese cities, varying sample periods. Real house prices (hp) on the left hand side, real 
per capita income (y), real land prices (lp), and real interest rate (r) on the right hand side of the cointe-
grating equation. R2 adjusted R-squared. Pooled mean group estimator of the cointegrating vector, accor-
ding to Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999). Entries denote elasticities of real house prices with respect to real 
per capita income and real land prices, and semi-elasticities with respect to the real interest rate, standard 
errors in parantheses. 23 
 
Table 3: Granger causality tests 
Δ(hp) does not cause Δ(cpi)  6.590 (0.014) 
Δ(cpi) does not cause Δ(hp)  0.003 (0.958) 
 
Δ(hp) does not cause Δ(y)  2.078 (0.157) 
Δ(y) does not cause Δ(hp)  0.004 (0.951) 
Note: National data, 1998.1-2009.4. Real house prices (hp), real per capita income (y), and cpi. Δ is the 
first difference operator. Lag length according to Schwarz information criterion. Entries denote F-values, 
p-values in parantheses. 
 24 
 
Table 4: Out-of sample forecasting performance 
  RMSFE  MAFE  Relative forecast accuracy 
CPI inflation  5.0  4.5  0.844 | 0.829 
GDP growth  4.1  2.9  0.924 | 0.958 
Note: The root mean squared forecast error (RMSFE) and mean absolute forecast error (MAFE) are taken 
from the autoregressive benchmark and expressed in percent. The relative forecast accuracy shows the 
RMSFE (left entry) or MAFE (right) relative to that of the benchmark. 
 25 
 
Figure 1: House price rent ratios in selected Chinese cities 
 




Figure 2: House price bubble in major Chinese cities 
 
Note: Size of the bubble expressed in percent of the fundamental value implied by the cointegrating 
relationship. 
 